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INTRODUCTION 
 
Flemming Rose, the culture editor of the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, defended his 
newspaper’s publication of caricatures of Mohammed as an act of defiance against increased 
self-censorship by artists and publishers on issues relating to Islam (Rose, 2006). This 
increased self-censorship, Rose claimed, was a response to intimidation from certain Muslim 
groups in Europe. Whilst regretting the violence and offense caused by the publication of the 
caricatures, Rose argued that principles of free speech justified taking a stand against self-
censorship caused by intimidation. Rose’s defense coheres with important liberal objections 
to self-censorship caused by threats and intimidation. However, as culture editor of a 
newspaper, Rose also points out that suppression of certain material is required by morality 
and taste. Jyllands-Posten does not publish images of dead bodies, and swear words are 
usually edited out of copy. Rose again appeals to what many would regard as considered 
convictions about the appropriateness of self-censorship in matters of taste, civility, and 
morality. As Jytte Klausen puts it in her discussion of the Danish cartoon incident, ‘[s]elf-
censorship may be caused by a credible fear of retaliation and bodily harm, but it may also 
follow out of respect for other people’s religious beliefs or from a desire not to hurt people’s 
feelings.’ (Klausen, 2009a, p. 16).  
 
Whilst the relationship between justifiable and unjustifiable self-censorship raises important 
normative questions, self-censorship also raises a prior, more fundamental question: does self-
censorship always require a censoring agent that exists independently of the censee? This 
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issue has been mentioned in passing without a full analysis of its implications. For instance, 
Randal Marlin states ‘[o]rdinary censorship typically provides us with a duality: a censoring 
authority and the censored communicator. How then, where censor and censored are one and 
the same person, does the notion of censorship get a foothold? We must suppose a duality 
within that person.’ (Marlin, 1999, p. 291). Whilst Marlin’s insight identifies the question, he 
offers no discussion of this proposed duality upon which self-censorship is based. The issue is 
also raised by Mark Cohen: ‘...is censorship only performed by a third party, or can it also 
take the form of self-suppression?’ (Cohen, 2001, p. 9). Cohen argues that self-censorship is a 
form of censorship because an individual can internalize public forms of censorship. 
However, like Marlin, Cohen also fails to analyze how self-censorship should be understood 
in the absence of an external censor.  
 
Our paper concentrates on this neglected question. Firstly, we suggest that public self-
censorship refers to a range of individual reactions to a public censorship regime. Self-
censorship thus understood means that individuals internalize some aspects of the public 
censor and then censor themselves. Secondly, private self-censorship is the suppression by an 
agent of her own attitudes where a public censor is either absent or irrelevant. Private self-
censorship is a process of regulation between what an individual regards as permissible to 
express publicly, and that which she wishes to express publicly. The purpose of this paper is 
therefore to distinguish two types of self-censorship: public and private. 
 
Previous scholarship that has addressed censorship and self-censorship has proceeded mostly 
by an inductive historical survey of censorship regimes.
i
 We approach our analysis of 
censorship and self-censorship differently. We do not develop and defend a conceptual 
definition of censorship and self-censorship that identifies necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the existence of censorship regimes. We focus instead on the question: who are the censor 
and the censee and how do they interact in censorship regimes? In addressing this question, 
we take as given that most cases of censorship will involve an interaction between censor and 
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censee regarding the expression of speech acts. Given this simple axiom, our analysis can 
proceed without depending on wider and more controversial definitions of the nature and 
normative character of censorship regimes. We provide a framework which we argue 
accurately characterizes features common to those censorship regimes which are of greatest 
practical concern, but accept that the content of this framework may vary given differing 
empirical circumstances and conceptions of censorship. By developing a framework that 
enables us to answer the question of who is the censor, who is the censee, and how do they 
interact, we are able to distinguish between cases in which censor and censee are different 
agents and in which they are the same agent. The former cases we label as instances of public 
self-censorship and the latter as instances of private self-censorship.  
 
Whilst our paper is primarily concerned with establishing this novel descriptive distinction 
between public and private self-censorship, our analysis has important implications for the 
evaluation of censorship regimes. It allows us to analyze existing cases of censorship and self-
censorship with new clarity. We explain for instance how our analysis reveals that the 
Jyllands-Posten acted as both public self-censor and private self-censor. By distinguishing 
these different roles of the Jyllands-Posten’s, greater precision in the evaluation of their 
actions is facilitated: the Jyllands-Posten’s actions as public self-censor cohere with liberal 
convictions regarding legitimacy of principles of free speech; yet as private self-censor the 
Jyllands-Posten seems to have unjustifiably discriminated between Christian and Muslim 
believers’ objections to caricatures regarding their faiths. Thus the different types of self-
censorship revealed by our analysis can structure normative evaluation. In general, our 
analysis reveals that the agents and processes involved in public and private self-censorship 
are substantively different, as are the agents to whom normative principles regarding 
censorship should be applied. In particular, principles of free speech do not apply directly to 
the case of private self-censorship, because whilst an instance of censorship, the absence of an 
external censor makes the censorship non-coercive.  
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The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, we provide a general framework for 
describing censorship and self-censorship that allows us to analyze the interaction between 
censors and censees. In the second section, we describe the distinction between public and 
private self-censorship in greater detail. In the third section we defend the distinction against a 
deflationary and a normative objection. The fourth section considers the implications of our 
analysis for normative discussions of self-censorship. We show that our analysis facilitates 
moral evaluation of instances of censorship by describing more precisely the identity of the 
censor and censee and their interaction. We conclude that the complex phenomena of 
censorship and self-censorship cannot be understood and evaluated without recognizing the 
two types of public and private self-censorship identified in this paper. 
 
 
DESCRIBING CENSORSHIP AND SELF-CENSORSHIP 
 
An important debate within the current literature on censorship is whether it is meaningful to 
speak of censorship by agents beyond the censorship regimes of states.
ii
 Can churches, 
corporations, or even social norms act as censors? Whist this debate alerts us to instances of 
censorship beyond explicit legal and political censorship regimes, it refers exclusively to a 
censor that exists independently from a censee. Self-censorship is therefore understood as a 
censee’s response to this externally existing censor. Yet, as suggested by Cohen, Klausen, and 
Marlin, there is an important class of cases where individuals censor themselves in the 
absence of an external censor. But if censorship involves an interaction between a censor and 
a censee, how can censorship exist in the absence of an external censor? We suggest that the 
features that characterize relationships of censorship between public censors and individuals 
can apply within individuals in the absence of externally existing censors. Thus, in order to 
examine instances of self-censorship where no external censor seems to exist, we first provide 
a descriptive framework to help us analyze censorship regimes. This framework allows us to 
understand the nature of self-censorship in standard cases of public censors and individuals. 
5 
 
Subsequently we show how censorship regimes can exist independently of externally existing 
censors, and how individuals can institute their own censorship regimes entirely privately.  
 
Self-censorship involves interactions between censors and censees, but interactions between 
censors and censees are only one feature of what we may more broadly describe as censorship 
regimes. Censorship regimes can be characterized along the following dimensions. Firstly, a 
goal common to censorship regimes is to create a fit between what they allow to be 
expressed, and what is actually expressed by censees.
iii
 In pursuing this goal, censors will 
normally have an implicit or explicit view on the content and mode of permitted and 
proscribed expressions. A censorship regime may object to certain kinds of content that 
offends against public decency or religious orthodoxy, or a censorship regime may object to 
how views are expressed, such as the Puritans’ bans on theatre. Censorship regimes will also 
normally provide a justification or defense of their censorship. Thus censorship regimes may 
be justified on such grounds as national security, public order, or democratic equality. 
Another feature common to censorship regimes, but on which they may differ substantively, 
is the manner of their enforcement. Different censorship regimes may rely on their power to 
suppress expression, for example by closing down newspapers or preventing access to the 
internet, whilst others may use their moral or institutional authority to enforce. Finally, a 
feature that distinguishes censorship regimes is the nature of the censor and censee.  
Describing censorship regimes along these different dimensions, we can examine their 
empirical and normative content: what is the ultimate goal, for instance, of the Chinese 
government’s internet censorship; what is the content of the expressions they seek to censor; 
how do they justify their censorship; how is the censorship enforced; and who are the censors 
and censees and how do they interact in this particular censorship regime? We may then wish 
to establish if the answers to these empirical questions are morally justified or not. Here, our 
concern is to focus on a particular interaction between censors and censees: an interaction that 
results in the censee censoring himself or herself. We therefore, for the large part, bracket 
both the empirical and normative issues associated with other descriptive dimensions of 
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censorship regimes. In particular, we do not maintain that the above dimensions constitute 
necessary and sufficient conditions for censorship. Rather, the dimensions allow us to 
describe empirical cases of censorship and characterize different conceptions of censorship. 
While such a framework may also be a useful starting point for developing a conceptual 
definition of censorship, we focus instead on working from the premise that most cases of 
censorship will involve a censor and censee interacting regarding the expression of speech 
acts, and we seek to understand these agents and their interaction.  
 
We begin this analysis of self-censorship with the most straightforward kind of censor and 
censee: a public censor interacting with an individual. There are a variety of ways in which 
censees can respond to such censorship. Intuitively, such responses can include degrees of 
opposition, compliance, being brainwashed, or self-censorship on the part of the individual. 
Here, we give a more fine-grained analysis of such responses.  
 
Censorship regimes can be more or less successful. In the limit case, they succeed in 
‘brainwashing’ all censees such that they create a perfect fit between the permitted 
expressions and the actual expressions of censees. Yet, many censorship regimes do not aim 
to change the private attitudes of censees, as long as the censored attitudes are not expressed 
or not acted on. In order to understand better the interaction between censors and censees it is 
natural to suppose that censees can have two different kinds of attitudes: those that are 
privately held, and those that are expressed publicly. Further suppose, for simplicity, that the 
censee can take one of three stances towards the censorship regime (whether its goal, the 
content of its proscriptions, or its justifications etc.): acceptance, opposition or indifference.
iv
 
Crucially, in order to analyze the degree of success in suppressing expression, the values of 
acceptance, opposition and indifference can characterize both the privately held attitudes and 
the public expression of the attitudes of censees. Depending on how her private and public 
attitudes change in response to the censorship, any censee can respond with ‘perfect 
alignment’, ‘perfect non-alignment’, and various forms of ‘weak alignment’ between their 
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privately held and publically expressed attitudes. The possible combinations are listed in the 
following table.  
 
Public Attitude 
 
Private Attitude 
Public Opposition Public Indifference Public Acceptance 
Private Opposition Perfect Alignment (1) 
Weak ‘Pragmatic’ Alignment 
(4) 
Perfect Non-Alignment (8) 
Private Indifference 
Weak ‘Idealistic 
Alignment’ (6) 
Perfect Alignment (2) 
Weak ‘Pragmatic’ Alignment 
(5) 
Private Acceptance Perfect Non-Alignment (9) 
Weak ‘Idealistic’ Alignment 
(7) 
Perfect Alignment (3) 
 
TABLE 1. Degrees of alignment between a censee’s private and public attitudes  
 
In the following, we consider each cell in the table, giving examples for a censorship regime 
in which the censor is public and the censored agents are private individuals. The three cases 
of perfect alignment describe a coherence between private and public attitudes: (1) full public 
and private opposition (e.g. an active dissenter), (2) full public and private indifference (e.g. 
an individual that is not interested at all in politics or society in a dictatorship), and (3) full 
public and private acceptance (e.g. a loyal party member in a one-party system). The two 
cases of weak ‘pragmatic’ alignment describe an incoherence between private and public 
attitudes: (4) public indifference with private opposition (e.g. a cautious dissenter), and (5) 
public acceptance with private indifference (e.g. a cautious apolitical person). The two cases 
of weak ‘idealistic’ alignment also describe an incoherence between private and public 
attitudes: (6) public opposition with private indifference (e.g. an individual with no strong 
private views, but a strong sense that the censor’s proscriptions are publicly offensive to some 
other individuals), and (7) public indifference with private acceptance (e.g. a party member in 
a one-party system who privately endorses the censor’s view on the grounds of ideology yet is 
unsure about whether such attitude should be voiced publicly). Finally, the two cases of 
perfect non-alignment describe a maximal incoherence of private and public attitudes: (8) 
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public acceptance with private opposition (e.g. a very cautious individual that fears 
consequences for showing even public indifference towards the censor), and  (9) public 
opposition with private acceptance (e.g. someone who opposes the censoring in principle 
even if agreeing with the censor’s judgment on the content of that which is proscribed).  
 
This taxonomy expresses to what extent a censee’s attitudes are in line with those required by 
the censor and how much her privately held and publically expressed attitudes differ.  
 
The extent to which censees align their truly held attitudes with the censor can occur for very 
different reasons. Recall the idea of enforcement that censorship regimes engage in which 
asks us how exactly a censor aims to enforce the required fit between that which it is 
permissible to express publically, and that which is actually expressed. We can characterize 
such enforcement along dimensions such as power (e.g. the ability to suppress such as closing 
plays), authority (e.g. legitimacy to suppress on grounds such as rule of law), independent 
justification (e.g. a censor’s appeal to values such as public order or human rights that are 
independent of their particular power and authority to censor), and a judgment regarding the 
content of the expressions (the censor’s appeal to the truth or validity of permissible 
expressions, or untruth of proscribed expressions). That is, we can describe an individual’s 
response to censorship as any combination of the nine degrees of success (Table 1) and 
dimensions of enforcement (such as power, authority, justification, content) that we can 
ascribe to a censorship regime. 
 
We have therefore provided a general framework for describing and analyzing censorship 
regimes and the interaction between censors and censee. This framework provides dimensions 
on which important features common to most censorship regimes can be described, without 
claiming that these dimensions are exclusive or exhaustive of all possible censorship regimes. 
Whilst our framework is not provided as a conceptual definition of censorship, it can be used 
to structure such conceptual analysis and evaluation of censorship and self-censorship. For 
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example, debates about whether censorship is necessarily morally objectionable may be 
clarified by utilizing our distinction between the goals and enforcement of censorship 
regimes, or locating disputes about the legitimacy of particular acts of censorship in questions 
of the authority or epistemic quality of the censor. An advantage of providing a general 
descriptive framework is that it may be applied to the empirical and normative analysis of a 
wide range of different kinds of censorship regimes. Most importantly for our purposes, it 
allows us to focus specifically on our question of the relationship between censor and censee, 
utilizing only a very limited assumption that censorship regimes involve interaction between a 
censor and censee regarding the expression of speech acts. 
 
Many intuitively plausible conceptions of self-censorship will center on those cases in which 
a public censorship regime results in non-alignment between her private and public attitudes, 
such as weak ‘pragmatic’ alignment (4. and 5. in Table 1), weak ‘idealistic’ alignment (6. and 
7.) or perfect non-alignment (8. and 9.). This can be interpreted as capturing the common 
intuition that self-censorship involves an effort on the part of an individual to resolve a 
conflict of attitudes between herself and the censor by balancing her commitments to her 
beliefs or values, and pragmatic concerns on if and how these should be expressed. It seems 
particularly plausible to identify self-censorship with the pragmatic responses of an individual 
to public censorship regimes, such as the responses of weak ‘pragmatic’ alignment (4. and 5.) 
and instances of ‘pragmatic’ perfect non-alignment (8.) of attitudes. Self-censorship seems 
particularly closely associated with instances where the conflict between an individual’s 
private attitudes and her public expression is based on a censorship regime that is enforced 
predominantly through power rather than legitimate authority. These more pragmatic 
responses to censorship can capture the common intuition that self-censorship is the result of 
a deliberative effort in which an individual endorses both their private attitudes and 
acknowledges (either merely pragmatically or even normatively) the censor’s point of view. 
One might contend that, given these discussions, conflict is an essential feature of self-
censorship.
v
 We do not take a stance on such conceptual definitions here, as this involves 
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making claims about the intrinsic features of censorship regimes that are unnecessary to our 
analysis. Such claims could also limit the applicability of the framework. For example, 
consider an implicit, (or counterfactual) public censorship regime from which conflict is by 
and large absent because the censees change and develop their own attitudes to align with the 
censorship regime as they believe they will be punished if they do not. Those seeking a 
conceptual definition of censorship regimes may dispute such borderline cases given that 
conflict between censor and censee is absent. But regardless of whether one accepts this as 
meeting the criteria for a censorship regime, our analysis can be fruitfully applied to the 
nature and interaction between the agent who constitutes the permissions on speech acts, and 
those subject to those permissions (the censor and censee as we describe them).   
  
The framework for the analysis of interactions between censor and censee describes in what 
way the censee responds to censor. This is particularly useful in clarifying different kinds of 
reactions to censors, and different types of censoring of oneself.  
 
 
 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SELF-CENSORSHIP 
 
This descriptive framework of censorship regimes is a tool for analyzing concrete cases of 
censorship, where there may be multiple censors and censees, and a variety of responses 
intertwined. We consider the recent case of the publication of caricatures of the Prophet 
Mohammed by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. 
 
In 2005, the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published 12 caricatures by different artists of 
the Prophet Mohammed. The representation of the Prophet Mohammed resulted in 
widespread criticism and objection, both to the very fact of a visual representation of the 
Prophet Mohammed (which is deemed unacceptable to many Muslims), and to 
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representations that seemed insulting and derogatory to the memory and regard for the 
Prophet and to the Islamic faith more generally (Klausen, 2009a). The controversy quickly 
centered on the issue of censorship and self-censorship. We leave aside the question of 
competing normative arguments regarding the proscriptions on expressions of images, or on 
how proscriptions should be enforced. We concentrate instead on the question of which 
censors and censees were involved in various aspects of this dispute. The answer to this 
question will reveal instances of self-censorship where there is an absence of an external 
censor.  
 
We begin first with a description of the general censorship regime. Danish law constitutes a 
public censorship regime. Section 77 of Denmark’s constitution forbids prior licensing of 
speech and therefore aims to protect freedom of speech and the freedom of the press, whilst 
sections of the Danish penal code restrict certain forms of speech such as  blasphemy (§140),
vi
 
racism/sexism (§266b), and libel (§267).
 vii
 Clearly, in this censorship regime, the Jyllands-
Posten is the censee, and the Danish legal system is the censor. How did the two interact? The 
Jyllands-Posten was accused of breaking various laws governing speech acts. The Danish 
Attorney General judged that there were no charges to answer under blasphemy and race hate 
laws, and Danish civil courts dismissed complaints of defamation (Klausen, 2009a, pp. 194-
196). According to the degree of alignment between attitudes held by the censee (the 
Jyllands-Posten), and the attitudes they actually expressed, we have instances of ‘perfect 
alignment’ of acceptance (3. in Table 1) between the Jyllands-Posten and the Danish regime’s 
general principles protecting of freedom of speech, but ‘perfect alignment’ of opposition (1. 
in Table 1) because the newspaper was explicitly critical of laws forbidding expressions on 
the grounds of blasphemy and racism.   
 
The Danish law was not the only censor in this conflict. Those members of the Muslim 
community who objected to the publication of the caricatures, and who wished to regulate the 
expression of attitudes about Islam and Mohammed in the public sphere can also be seen as 
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censors in the descriptive sense outlined earlier. The enforcement of their proscriptions on 
expression was conducted through a range of social, political, and economic actions by 
various Muslim groups. These included attempts at international denunciation of Denmark at 
the UN (Klausen, 2009a, pp. 63-82)  and an economic boycott of Danish goods in certain 
Muslim countries (Klausen, 2009a, pp. 72-76) which was meant to increase pressure on the 
Danish government and society to  persuade the Jyllands-Posten to withdraw the cartoons. 
More controversially, certain members of the Muslim community threatened and even 
committed acts of violence to employees of Jyllands-Posten (Klausen, 2009a, p. 58) and other 
Danish citizens (Klausen, 2009a, p. 46). Indeed, the Danish police advised the cartoonists to 
keep silent in the face of such threats. In this case, we can see that whilst the censees remain 
the Jyllands-Posten and any other newspaper or individual with access to publishing, the 
censors are those parts of the Muslim community that have threatened (and/or carried out) 
violence, legal action and public pressure with regards to the publishing of the cartoons. 
 
The Jyllands-Posten cannot be said to have censored themselves in response to parts of the 
Muslim community as censor because they published the caricatures and subsequently 
defended their publication. Our analytical framework however helps identify the different 
kinds of interaction between the Muslim community as censor and the Jyllands-Posten as 
censee. The publication of the caricatures by the Jyllands-Posten was in opposition to 
perceived censorship by the Muslim community, and the attitudes they actually expressed 
were intended to voice that opposition (1. in Table 1). The basis for such ‘perfect alignment’ 
of opposition was the Jyllands-Posten’s contestation of the Muslim community’s perceived 
power to enforce censorship, their rejection of the authority of this group of Muslims to create 
and enforce a view of what it is permissible to express publicly, and their rejection of a 
theological framework in which religious offense restricts the rights of others to free 
expression (Klausen, 2009a, pp. 20-27). Jytte Klausen points out: ‘The cartoons were printed 
around the margin of an essay, and the headline of the essay was “Mohammed’s Ansigt” 
which means the face of Mohammed. […] it was a cartoon editorial, it was a provocation. 
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[…] They deliberately wanted to break a taboo and that’s why it was printed.’ (Klausen, 
2009b, pp. 77-78). 
 
If we now turn our attention to the different censees that were involved in this dispute, we can 
begin to describe instances of self-censorship.  Many publishers and news organizations 
refrained from publishing the caricatures. Yale University Press, the publisher of Jytte 
Klausen’s The Cartoons that Shook the World, declined to publish the cartoons on the stated 
grounds of safety and security.  In this case we can characterize Yale University Press as a 
censee responding to the censorship regime of parts of the Muslim community who objected 
to the publication of the caricatures. Yale University Press is in a condition of perfect non-
alignment between private opposition to the public censor prohibiting the publication and 
public acceptance of the censorship by not publishing (i.e 8. in Table 1). This perfect non-
alignment seems based on a pragmatic acknowledgment that public opposition threatens 
violence, a principled rejection of the authority of any violent objectors to stifle free speech, 
indifference or perhaps disagreement that there is a theological basis for objecting to the 
caricatures, and indifference that the content of the caricatures is offensive.  This analysis 
suggests that Yale University Press reluctantly responded to this public censorship regime 
with a type of self-censorship. Theirs is a response to a perceived external censor, which in 
this case consists of some members of a community who threatened violence in response to 
the expression of an attitude it opposes.
viii
 Therefore, by paying close attention to the nature of 
the censor and censee and the nature of their interaction, self-censorship as a response by a 
censee (Yale University Press) to a censor that exists independently of them (those in the 
Muslim community who object to the publication) is identified. If we extend this analysis and 
attend to further kinds of censor and censee, we find that a different type of self-censorship 
emerges. 
 
In the preceding discussion, we identified the Jyllands-Posten as a censee responding to the 
censorship regime of the Danish law and those in the Muslim community who objected to the 
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publication of the caricatures. However, the Jyllands-Posten may also be described as 
performing the role of censor in relation to its journalists and what they are allowed to express 
in print. The proprietors and editors of Jyllands-Posten act as censor as they permit and 
proscribe expression that promotes the goal of publishing a newspaper that exercises 
influence which fulfills the moral, political, commercial, aesthetic, and professional values of 
the publishers and editors. For example, Jytte Klausen points out that the Jyllands-Posten is 
broadly center-right in its political support and editorial, and that it is the largest selling 
Danish broadsheet newspaper (Klausen, 2009a, p. 11). The contributors who choose to write 
for the Jyllands-Posten accept the authority and ability of the editors to constrain that which 
they publish, and so the censorship regime between the newspaper and its writers is broadly 
consensual.  We can now analyze the interaction between censor and censee thus described. 
The individual journalists on the Jyllands-Posten may have views that conflict with what the 
editors permit to be published by the newspaper, for example they may take a different 
political line on a given issue, or believe the newspaper’s copy editing suppresses good 
writing. We might describe journalists who suppress such disagreements as in a condition of 
holding private opposition to the policies and practices of the newspaper but expressing 
public indifference or acceptance. Our account describes such journalists as in a condition of 
either weak ‘pragmatic’ alignment (such as 4. and 5. in Table 1) or perfect non-alignment (8. 
and 9.) of their own attitudes.  
 
Notoriously, the Jyllands-Posten declined to print unsolicited caricatures of Jesus on the 
grounds that they would cause offense to readers (Fouché, 2006). Such suppression occurs 
within a domain of discretion created by Danish law and norms (expression of such images is 
permitted and not required, therefore discretion is created). Within this domain of discretion 
created by Danish law, the publishers and editors constitute their own rules and norms 
regarding permissible expression of images of Jesus. If we regard the Jyllands-Posten as 
acting as the sole arbiter and enforcer of rules of expression in this domain, then we can see 
that the newspaper is acting as censor over itself and what it publishes, in the absence of an 
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external public censor. Therefore, by concentrating on the question of who are the censor and 
censee and what is their interaction, we identify a type of self-censorship where the censor 
and the censee are the same agent, and this agent acts as censor over herself in the absence of 
an externally existing public censor.  
 
We have therefore identified two types of self-censorship: one where the censor and censee 
are separate agents and where the censee censors herself in response to this external censor; 
and one where the censor and censee are the same agent and this agent censors herself in the 
absence of an external censor. We characterize these two types of self-censorship as public 
self-censorship, and private self-censorship.  
 
 
DEFENDING TWO TYPES OF SELF-CENSORSHIP 
 
We now consider two objections against our distinction between public and private self-
censorship, starting with a ‘deflationary’ objection that aims to reduce the discussion of self-
censorship to public self-censorship. We then respond to the challenge that from the point of 
view of freedom of speech, self-censorship does not constitute censorship proper.  
 
How Private is Private?  
 
Consider the following deflationary objection: that any instance of self-censorship can be 
adequately described as a response to a public censorship regime.
ix
 This view maintains that 
there is only one type of self-censorship, namely public. In contrast, we claim that even if 
many cases of private self-censorship can have a ‘public’ flavor to them, there are cases of 
censorship in which there is no public censor. In order to defend this claim, we distinguish 
between two ways in which private self-censorship can be established. Firstly, there are 
undoubtedly many cases of private self-censorship where someone censors herself by taking a 
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point of view external to her own private perspective: for example, an individual who is a 
member of an association may reflect on what the norms of the association imply for what she 
should express when participating in the association. We label such cases as private self-
censorship by proxy. Secondly, there are cases in which an individual formulates her own 
conception of what it is permissible to express: for example, a person may develop a personal 
code where it is deemed impermissible to express obscene language or to speak about money 
in public company. We label such cases as private self-censorship by self-constraint.  
 
Consider the example of Anne, Brian and Chris who are three work colleagues. Anne and 
Brian both dislike Chris but say nothing. Chris moves to another job. Brian starts to insult 
Chris in private to Anne. Anne shares all of Brian’s views on Chris, and knows that their 
private conversation could never get back to Chris or anyone else, and therefore there could 
be no punishment for expressing the same attitudes as Brian. However, Anne does not wish to 
express these views.  
 
The example of the colleagues can represent an instance of private self-censorship where 
Anne chooses not to express her own critical attitudes by considering what she regards as 
appropriate constraints on what she expresses publicly.
x
 If the sources of those constraints are 
external to Anne, for instance she wishes to abide by a social norm, then we can describe this 
as private self-censorship by proxy. If the sources of values and principles that constrain her 
expression are internal to Anne, for instance that she chooses to lead a life without talking 
behind people’s backs out of a personal sense of decency, then we can describe this as private 
self-censorship by self-constraint.  
 
The notion of private self-censorship by proxy allows us to characterize cases that seem, 
prima facie, to be cases of public self-censorship. But on closer examination we find that 
there is no external censor, and so these are best described as cases of private self-censorship. 
In these cases, public motivations, such as the norms of an association, provide the point of 
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view from which an individual censors herself. It would be a mistake to characterize those 
cases as public self-censorship, as there is no public censor.  That is, the source of this point 
of view is external to the individual (the norms of an association), but this external point of 
view is not a censor that fits with our general descriptive framework (for example, the 
association does not enforce a particular view of what should be expressed publically). In the 
case of public self-censorship, the censor is an agent that exists independently of the censee. 
In the case of private self-censorship by proxy, the censee is not interacting with an externally 
existing censor, but rather is herself taking a point of view that is not simply personal and 
private.   
 
Consider Anne from the example above. In the case of private self-censorship by proxy, the 
individual was taking a point of view external from that of her private commitments: perhaps 
a point of view of her as an employee of a firm, or member of an association. By reflecting 
and internalizing the values and norms of this external point of view, an individual may 
extrapolate what it is appropriate to express qua member of the firm or association, even in 
the absence of such things as an official code of conduct on expression. In private self-
censorship by self-constraint, an individual develops a regime that regulates and constrains 
what she expresses publicly that derives its authority and efficacy through personal reflection 
and reasoning, and not through interaction with, or by taking the standpoint of, an external 
agent. Thus private self-censorship by self-constraint also includes a censor and censee 
interacting, but the origin and nature of this standpoint are wholly internal to the individual.  
 
The deflationary objection argues that there are no cases of private self-censorship by self-
constraint, but rather that they reduce to private self-censorship by proxy, and that all cases of 
private self-censorship by proxy are instances of public self-censorship. Let us consider the 
first step in the objection by reconsidering the case of the colleagues. In the self-constraint 
case, the individual is taking some of her attitudes as lexicographically prior to her other 
attitudes, but she is not taking a point of view of an external agent. According to the 
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objection, Anne’s self-suppression can be traced to some public agent, such as a firm’s 
official code of conduct of public decency in the workplace. However, for an individual to 
reason, adopt, and act from the standpoint of some set of principles or norms, is not 
necessarily to reason or act from the point of view of some external agent. Thus, the objection 
seems to rest on conflating agency with standpoint. Hence reducing all cases of self-
censorship to public self-censorship would limit our understanding of the processes by which 
agents can regulate their behavior. 
 
While we accept that what might at first appear to be self-censorship by self-constraint may 
often be an outcome of a certain process of self-censorship by proxy, the ability of an agent to 
adopt a standpoint from which they can assess and regulate the expression of his or her own 
attitudes does not depend on that standpoint always reducing to an external agent. Hence, 
private self-censorship, where the censor and the censee are the same agent, fulfills a vital 
role in capturing an important aspect of censorship. 
 
The distinction between two types of self-censorship also allows us to carefully describe 
exactly those cases of self-censorship which may be worrying from a normative point of 
view. Think of cases in which an individual gradually internalizes public censorship, such as 
followers of a sect that are successfully indoctrinated by repeated censorship, or 
disempowered individuals whose self-expression is suppressed such that they come to 
independently anticipate, extend, and even embrace the censorship regime that oppresses 
them. We may describe such cases initially as public self-censorship, as there is an external 
censor to which the individual responds. We can also characterize different degrees to which 
the individual aligns with the external censor. Yet, it may be the case that the individual also 
continues to censor him- or herself in the absence or an external censor, such as when the 
external censor ceases to exist: for instance, when the sect dissolves, or legislation is passed 
that ensures equal rights to expression. Such self-censorship – which began as public self-
censorship – has been transformed, through its persistence in the absence of the original 
19 
 
public censor, into private self-censorship. Depending on the degree to which the censee's 
motives are private, they constitute private self-censorship by proxy or by self-constraint. For 
instance, the behavior of a former follower of a sect may be adequately described by self-
censorship by proxy if the individual constrains him- or herself by the rules of the former sect 
even in light of its demise: the point of view is still external, but there is no longer an external 
censor. Likewise, the behavior of a member of a minority group may be described by self-
censorship by self-constraint if years of oppression have led the individual to believe in her 
own inadequacy, which persists even if the original source of the suppression has been 
nullified by law. The examples mentioned here are important from a normative point of view, 
and the distinction between two types of self-censorship allows us to describe them carefully 
so as to be precise in our normative evaluation. However, we do not wish to claim that an 
application of our distinction will always yield an unequivocal description of any given case. 
The empirical richness of actual cases of censorship and self-censorship may well lead to 
disagreements about whether, for instance, we can identify an instance of private self-
censorship by proxy, or one of public self-censorship. Yet, we maintain that it is useful for 
conceptual and normative discussions that such complexity is brought to attention by our 
distinction. 
 
Does Self-Censorship Constitute Censorship at All? 
 
There is a second objection to the distinction between private and public self-censorship. It 
begins with the view that the concept of censorship is connected to freedom of speech 
because censorship is always by one agent over another and as such is intrinsically public. On 
this view, self-censorship is a misnomer because principles of free speech cannot be applied 
by individuals to themselves, and if principles of freedom of speech do not apply, then 
censorship cannot exist.  
 
In order to address this objection, we consider Schauer’s conception of censorship that leads 
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him to deny the existence of private and public self-censorship. Fredrick Schauer argues that 
public censorship is characterized by the discretionary power of governments to control 
speech (Schauer, 1982, pp. 122-123). For Schauer, censorship only occurs in conditions of 
‘non-necessary choice’ about the expression of speech acts. Schauer argues that governments 
have discretionary power over speech because they are not participants in speech-act 
relationships in the same way as individuals. Individuals and voluntary associations 
necessarily have to choose to whom and to what they listen, and to whom they allow 
opportunities to speak. Such a choice is necessary for individuals and voluntary associations 
because of pragmatic restrictions on individuals hearing all people or points of view, or 
providing opportunities to all others to speak. Schauer therefore associates censorship with 
government alone, because government is the only kind of agent that is in a condition of non-
necessary choice about the expression of speech acts. In contrast, individuals have to make 
necessary choices about speech acts.  
 
Schauer maintains that principles of free speech are inapplicable to self-censorship because 
principles of free speech do not apply when individuals necessarily have to make a choice 
between what they hear (more broadly, the speech acts they receive). The fact that individuals 
necessarily have to choose to not hear some voices or expressions means that they cannot be 
held morally culpable for having to make such a choice. Equally, those whose voices are not 
heard cannot claim a right to be heard on grounds of principles of freedom of speech, because 
they are claiming a right that could not possibly be enforced because it is pragmatically 
infeasible. Since individuals are in a condition of necessary choice about their reception of 
speech acts, ‘[t]his additional dimension of private suppression as an act of speech, or at least 
a corollary to it, sharply distinguishes private from government censorship, and makes the 
notion of private self-censorship almost self-contradictory.’ (Schauer, 1982, pp. 122-123). 
Our descriptive approach disputes this elimination of private and public self-censorship and 
provides support for those who accuse Schauer of holding a too restrictive view of censorship 
(Cohen, 2001; Soley, 2002).  
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Our approach shows how principles of free speech can be extended to public self-censorship. 
Consider the case of a legitimate public censorship regime: agents who align the expression 
of their attitudes with it are behaving justifiably. Conversely, if a public censorship regime is 
normatively problematic, for instance one that intimidates and threatens the censees, then 
opposition may be morally permissible or even obligatory, in preference to public self-
censorship. Consequently, our approach allows us to normatively evaluate the role of the 
censor and censee.  
 
When considering private self-censorship we agree that principles of free speech are 
inapplicable, but on different grounds from Schauer. Principles of free speech relate to 
coercive relationships between agents: namely a public censor and a censee. Our descriptive 
approach suggests that analysis of the legitimacy of censorship regimes should focus on the 
actions of the censor. We agree with Schauer that it is entirely appropriate to consider public 
censorship regimes under principles of free speech. The wrong that is involved in violations 
of free speech must include, inter alia, the wrong of coercing an agent to suppress her speech 
against her will or interests. Can such a wrong (namely a wrong of coercion) be performed by 
an individual on the expression of her own attitudes? We argue: no. Private self-censorship 
does not involve an interpersonal relationship between agents as censor and censee; private 
self-censorship consists in an intrapersonal relationship within an agent where they act as both 
censor and censee. It is impossible for an individual to coerce herself by restricting her own 
freedom of speech through private self-censorship, because coercion must involve the 
restriction of the action of one agent by another.
xi
 As we mentioned earlier, private self-
censorship is an instance of an intrapersonal relationship within an agent between different 
standpoints they take towards his or her own attitudes.  Private self-censorship by proxy 
involves an agent taking an external standpoint, whilst private self-censorship by self-
constraint involves an individual taking a standpoint different from her first person standpoint 
on her expressions, such as a second person standpoint of common decency, maximal utility, 
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or deontological morality. As private self-censorship is based on intrapersonal relationships 
between different standpoints and not interpersonal relationships between agents, coercion is 
inapplicable. Coercion therefore requires an interpersonal relationship. Private self-
censorship, by its very definition, is an intrapersonal relationship.  
 
The understanding of censorship derived from our descriptive framework coheres with the 
view that principles of free speech apply to censorship. However, our view specifies that the 
principles of free of speech apply only to public self-censorship, and shows that for private 
self-censorship, the intrapersonal conflicts that we argue characterize private self-censorship 
are not subsumable under normative notions of freedom of speech. We leave open the 
possibility that these types of intrapersonal conflict may require a normative principle of some 
other kind to regulate the interests or competing considerations that may be derived from the 
different standpoints that are in conflict.  
 
 
TWO TYPES OF SELF-CENSORSHIP AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
The goal of this paper is to clarify self-censorship by focusing on the question of who is the 
censor and censee, and how do they interact? We have therefore bracketed questions of the 
normative status of censorship in general and of any particular censorship regime. In this 
sense, our paper is akin to a descriptive analysis of, for example, the phenomenon of lying: 
can a distinction be made between lying to others (public deception) and lying to oneself 
(self-deception). The question of whether there are features that distinguish the phenomenon 
of public deception from self-deception can be addressed independently of a normative 
evaluation of the content or consequences of lying or any particular lie. 
But it might be objected that censorship, and by extension self-censorship, is intrinsically 
morally problematic (or at least has intrinsic moral content) as it involves suppression of 
expressions, even if in certain cases suppression may be permissible due to other 
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considerations such as preventing harm.  Consequently, the objection maintains that our 
analysis fails to recognise the intrinsic moral content of censorship. We suggest two responses 
to such objections. 
 
Censorship, Self-Censorship, and Thick Evaluative Concepts  
 
Firstly, we acknowledge that censorship and self-censorship seem to fit Bernard Williams’s 
notion of thick evaluative concepts that include both descriptive and evaluative dimensions, 
(Williams, 1985, p. 141). However whilst censorship may include both descriptive and 
evaluative dimensions (where censorship is usually evaluated negatively), this does not imply 
that these dimensions are indistinguishable.  
 
Earlier, we set out a general framework for analyzing censorship regimes that included the 
goal of the censorship regime, the methods of enforcement, the grounds for justification, the 
content of that which they seek to suppress, and the agents who interact as censor and censee. 
Our discussion has focused on the identity of and interaction between censor and censee in 
instances of self-censorship. It seems to us that the other dimensions along which censorship 
regimes may be identified and analyzed are permeated with normative issues: what are 
morally acceptable goals, if any, for censorship regimes; do certain justifications for 
censorship successfully defeat other objections to censorship based on free speech; what are 
morally permissible methods of enforcement; should certain content of expressions be 
immune from suppression? A comprehensive theory of censorship would address these 
normative matters, and may indeed take the view that censorship is intrinsically morally 
problematic. But it is possible, as we intend to show here, that the question of the identity and 
interactions of censor and censee can be analysed separately from these normative matters, 
just as the question of who is the person lying and who is being lied to can be addressed 
separately from the question of whether the lie is morally objectionable. An analysis of the 
identity of the agents within a censorship and self-censorship regime does not depend on a 
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prior normative evaluation of the substance of their actions as censor or censee. Our approach 
therefore succeeds in identifying the salient features of censorship regimes, and recognizes 
that a complete theory of censorship will include a normative account of all dimensions. Our 
argument however distinguishes an important descriptive question within a broader 
framework of understanding censorship, and seeks to clarify the identity and interaction of 
censor and censee in instances of self-censorship. 
 
 
Two Types of Self-Censorship as a Basis for Normative Analysis 
 
In response to the criticism that our analysis of censorship and self-censorship has neglected 
the normative dimension of censorship, or even perpetrated the view that censorship is 
morally neutral when it is in fact morally problematic, we claim that our analysis clarifies the 
dimensions of censorship and self-censorship that demand moral evaluation. We have 
outlined those we feel lend themselves best to characterize censorship regimes, and are thus 
most susceptible to moral analysis and evaluation, including the goal, methods, and 
justification of the censorship regime. Whilst our analysis has focused on clarifying the 
identity and interaction of censor and censee in instances of self-censorship, our conclusion 
that there are two types of self-censorship does itself have implications for how normative 
analysis of self-censorship should be conducted. Recall our discussion of the Danish cartoon 
incident. Our framework provides a unique explanation of the different kinds of agents 
involved, and the variety of possible interactions between them. This unique account of the 
agents and their interactions reveals the different normative principles that apply, and to 
whom they apply. In order to exemplify how our model may be employed constructively 
within normative analysis of censorship regimes, consider two very different responses to the 
publication of the cartoons by the Jyllands-Posten.  
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The first response, voiced by the Danish government and many sympathetic newspapers, was 
that the newspaper was justified in publishing the cartoons because it is impermissible to 
censor speech through threats of violence, and that the value and rights to freedom of speech 
in democratic polities (enshrined in Danish law and the European Convention on Human 
Rights) trump claims by offended parties to suppress speech on grounds of offence (Fode, 
2006).
xii
  Our model reveals that this response recognizes the public censorship regime of 
Danish law as legitimate, and the public censorship regime instituted by parts of the Muslim 
community as illegitimate. The Jyllands-Posten was aligned with the Danish law’s principles 
of freedom of speech, yet was in conflict with parts of the Muslim community. Hence, 
normative evaluation of the Jyllands-Posten’s actions as a response to censorship requires 
differentiating the two public censorship regimes with which the newspaper was interacting. 
Such differentiation is required because supporters of the Jyllands-Posten would regard the 
Danish censorship regime as legitimate, and the censorship regime instituted by that part of 
the Muslim community who objected as illegitimate. Therefore, our framework specifies that 
the normative issue at stake is a conflict between two opposing censorship regimes, and their 
competing claims to legitimacy.  
 
The second response regards the Jyllands-Posten’s actions as morally wrong as they caused 
offense, hurting the feelings of members of a minority religious group who suffer many 
injustices, caused outrage and festered division between cultures. Our view helps clarify that 
this is a normative assessment of the Jyllands-Posten’s private self-censorship regime. Using 
our analysis, a normative evaluation could focus on the inconsistency of the Jyllands-Posten’s 
actions because as a private censor it acknowledged that the claims of Christian believers 
should constrain that which they express, whilst rejecting the prima facie equivalent claims of 
Muslim believers. Thus, our focus on the nature of the agents who interact in censorship 
regimes, and the distinction between public and private self-censorship provided by our 
analysis, reveals a particular moral identity of the Jyllands-Posten as private self-censor, 
which facilitates moral evaluation by being clear on the nature of agents involved.  
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The distinction between private and public self-censorship is particularly useful in analyzing 
the more recent controversies in the Danish cartoon case. In February 2010, a settlement 
between the newspaper Politiken, which had reprinted the cartoons and eight organizations 
representing 94,923 of the Prophet Mohammed’s descendants, was reached with the latter 
dropping legal action against the newspaper. As part of the settlement, the newspaper 
Politiken issued a statement in which they apologized for the offense caused by their 
reprinting the cartoons in question (Isherwood, 2010). This statement was met by harsh 
criticism from Danish media, politicians and also the Jyllands-Posten: ‘Politiken has betrayed 
the battle for freedom of speech. They’ve given up and bowed to threats. That is, of course, 
disgraceful,’ (Isherwood, 2010) its Editor-in-Chief Mikkelsen said in response. The three 
censorship regimes discussed earlier help to analyze these developments. Firstly, Politiken’s 
statement frames the problem in terms of apologizing for failed private self-censorship. 
Secondly, the statement arose in the context of a lawsuit that can be described as being an 
element of the public censorship regime in which parts of the Muslim community participate. 
Thirdly, the Jyllands-Posten’s reaction draws on free speech, framing the problem in terms of 
the perceived legitimacy of the Danish public censor and the perceived illegitimacy of the 
public censorship regime by parts of the Muslim community. This suggests that the public 
debate about the cartoon incident can be seen as disagreements about which of the censorship 
regimes involved are salient, and which are legitimate and which are illegitimate.  
 
Consequently, our focus on clarifying the identity and interaction between censor and censee, 
particularly in cases of self-censorship, allows us to make finer distinctions between the 
various censorship regimes, their protagonists, and their behavior. As mentioned before, we 
do not wish to claim that there is only one correct description of a given case of censorship 
and self-censorship that results from applying our distinction. It is possible to disagree about, 
for instance, the extent to which the Jyllands-Posten was a private self-censor and the extent 
to which journalists and freelance journalists can be taken as constituting separate agents, so 
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that censor and censee are also different agents. Yet, such disagreements are important to 
consider, and they arise in virtue of distinguishing two types of self-censorship. Greater 
descriptive clarity that is afforded by identifying different agents and analyzing their relations 
can then form the basis for normative analysis of censorship and self-censorship.
xiii
 
Consequently, there is a broad range of important cases, where public censorship regimes not 
only cause agents to censor themselves, but where those agents also have to consider on what 
basis they regulate that which they express publicly. The analysis of censorship and self-
censorship we have developed in this paper helps elucidate such complex cases, and 
facilitates a normative analysis of the relationships of all actors involved.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have argued for a distinction between two types of self-censorship: public and private. 
Applying the framework for the analysis of censor-censee interactions we have introduced in 
this paper, we find that the two types are based on different censors and censees interacting: 
in public self-censorship, the censor is a public agent, such as a government or public 
authority, and the censees are private individuals or corporations. By contrast, in private self-
censorship, censee and censor are the same agent, such that the censorship process involves 
the suppression of attitudes within one individual. We have distinguished two conceptions of 
private self-censorship, namely by proxy and by self-constraint, to highlight the degrees to 
which sources for private self-censorship can be external or internal to an agent. We maintain 
that the distinctions we introduce in this paper are relevant for the normative analysis of 
complex cases of censorship and self-censorship, and the interaction between censors and 
censees. We argued that principles of free speech are not directly applicable in cases of 
private self-censorship. Thus, the distinction between public and private self-censorship 
established here enables clarification of the complexities of censorship and self-censorship, 
and the normative and descriptive problems associated with them. 
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i
 Whilst this scholarship illuminates the varieties of censorship in history, it has often resulted in vague 
and broad notions of censorship and self-censorship, such as David Tribe, 1973, p. 16 on censorship as 
well as Jansen, 1988, O’Higgins, 1972, and Thomas, 2008 on self-censorship. 
ii
 Schauer, 1982, pp. 122-123; Andre, 1982; Andre, 1992; Cohen, 2001; Soley, 2002.  
iii
 We use the notion of ‘expression’ throughout this discussion as a placeholder for the wide range of 
phenomena that may be censored. These may be written, verbal, pictorial, musical etc. Our analysis of 
the nature and relationship between censor and censee does not depend on any particular conception of 
the content of that which is supressed through censorship. 
iv
 It is also possible to analyze the censee's responses in a less fine-grained way, such as with a binary 
framework (acceptance; opposition) or in a more fine-grained way, by assigning propositions numbers 
in a real interval [0,1] that give a range from acceptance (1) to opposition (0). 
v
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing our attention to this point. 
vi
 In practice, the blasphemy law has become moribund and decisions about the publication of religious 
images are governed by individual discretion, and not criminal law. 
vii
 There are of course many more aspects of the Danish legal regime that affect the expression of 
speech acts. In an interesting twist Kurt Westergaard (the artist of the caricature of the prophet 
Mohammad with a bomb in his turban) successfully used Danish copyright law to suppress the 
reproduction of his caricature in a film by the Danish MP Geert Wilders called Fitna. Wilders claimed 
his film was an extension of Jyllands-Posten’s challenge to self-censorship. Westergaard’s use of 
copyright law to restrict unauthorised reproduction of his caricature is a further example of how speech 
affecting law may be characterised as part of a censorship regime under our approach. 
viii
 As in the aforementioned case of Westergaard and Wilders, Yale University Press can also be seen 
to act as censor over both the artists of the cartoons, and following Scanlon’s notion of an ‘audience 
interest’ in freedom of speech, the reading public who are denied the opportunity to view the cartoons 
in Klausen’s book (Scanlon, 1972) 
ix We do not engage with the converse deflationary objection – reducing the two types exclusively to 
private self-censorship – as endorsing this objection would make it impossible to uphold certain 
intuitive understandings of self-censorship in response to public censors.  
x
 Anne’s actions may plausibly be described as self-censorship as there is an interaction between the 
rules she uses to regulate what she expresses publically, and those attitudes she actually holds. Such 
cases are consonant with our initial premise that central cases of censorship include the existence of a 
censor and censee interacting regarding the expression of speech acts. 
xi
 Our argument that principles of freedom of speech do not apply to private self-censorship relies on 
the absence of coercion in intrapersonal relationships regarding speech. As outlined in our initial 
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discussion of private self-censorship by self-constraint we accept that norms and principles may be 
formulated and adopted by individuals that govern their own speech acts, but these are not coercive as 
they are implemented by the person herself. 
xii
 Whilst the Danish public prosecutor explicitly states the supremacy of the value and rights of 
freedom of speech over claims to suppress speech on grounds of offense (enshrined in Article 10(1) of 
the ECHR, he also refers to Article 10(2) which states that the right to freedom of speech creates duties 
on individuals not to commit speech acts that threaten (inter alia) national security, public health and 
safety,  and which may be enforced legally. The reference to duties on individuals regarding their 
speech acts that are enforceable by law in Article 10(2) seems classifiable as duties of public self-
censorship (by proxy when not enforceable) on our scheme. 
xiii
 John Horton’s analysis seems to implicitly accept the distinction between two types of self-
censorship that we develop here, but he argues that the distinction impedes clarity in discussing self-
censorship. As our discussion of the Jyllands-Posten case has shown, denial of two types of self-
censorship prevents clarity regarding who acts as censor and censee, which censorship regimes are 
involved, and therefore who should be the subject of normative evaluation (Horton, 2011). 
